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Many individuals simultaneously have signiﬁcant credit card debt and money in the bank.
The credit card debt puzzle is, given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank
accounts, why not pay down the debt? While economists have recently gone to elaborate
lengths to explain this observation, we argue that it is nothing more than the venerable rate
of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We therefore analyze the issue by
extending standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt. This seems interesting
in its own right, since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing
challenge, and it helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.
∗We thank Neil Wallace, Ed Nosal, and participants in seminars at Penn and the Federal Reserve Banks
of Cleveland and New York for feedback. We thank the National Science Foundation and the Jacob K. Javitz
Graduate Fellowship Fund for research support. The usual disclaimer applies.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large number of households simultaneously have signiﬁcant credit card debt and a signiﬁcant
amount of money in their checking and savings accounts. Although there are many ways to
measure this, a simple summary statistic is that 27% of U.S. households in 2001 had credit
card debt in excess of $500 and over $500 in the bank; and the median such household revolved
around $3,800 of credit card debt and had $3,000 in the bank (see Telyukova 2005). The so-called
credit card debt puzzle is this: given 14% interest rates on credit cards, and 1 or 2% on bank
accounts, why not pay down the debt? “Such behavior is puzzling, apparently inconsistent with
no-arbitrage and thus inconsistent with any conventional model.” (Gross and Souleles 2001).
Economists have gone to elaborate lengths to explain this type of phenomena. For example,
some people assume that consumers cannot control themselves (Laibson et al. 2000); others
assume they cannot control their spouses (Bertaut and Haliassos 2002; Haliassos and Reiter
2003); and still others hypothesize that such households are typically on the verge of bankruptcy
(Lehnert and Maki, 2001). While these ideas are interesting, and may contain elements of truth,
we think it is useful to point out that the credit card debt puzzle is actually not a new observation.
Rather, it is “simply” another ramiﬁcation of the venerable rate of return dominance puzzle
from monetary economics, and hence, insights may be gained by using models and ideas from
monetary theory. In particular, the relevant notion is liquidity.1
Our hypothesis is the following. Households need money — generally, relatively liquid assets
— for contingencies where it is diﬃcult or costly to use credit. It is important to note that there
are many big-ticket items for which this is the case, over and above the usual examples like
taxis and cigarettes. For instance, usually rent or mortgage payments cannot be made by credit
card. Also, many less perfectly anticipated events such as household repairs (plumbing, heating,
air conditioning, etc.) often require cash, for whatever reason, and getting caught short can be
1The idea that agents may hold assets with low rates of return because they are relatively liquid — i.e. because
they have potential advantages as a medium of exchange — underlies much of modern monetary theory going back
to Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). And, as we discuss below, it goes back much further in the less formal literature.
2very costly.2 Even if agents are revolving credit card debt, they need to have some cash easily
accessible to meet these contingencies. The point may be obvious — but this does not mean that
it would not be interesting to analyze it in detail.
The rate of return dominance question and the idea that some notion of liquidity ought to be
part of the solution goes back a long time. Hicks (1935) is well known for challenging monetary
economists to “look frictions in the face” when framing “the central issue in the pure theory of
money” as the need for an explanation of the fact that people hold money when rates of interest
are positive. One perhaps better known version of the challenge is to explain “the decision to
hold assets in the form of barren money, rather than of interest- or proﬁt-yielding securities.”
But the same issue arises in reverse: “So long as interest rates are positive, the decision to hold
money rather than lend it, or use it to pay oﬀ old debts, is apparently an unproﬁtable one” (Hick
1935, p.5, emphasis added).
We believe there is something to be gained by analyzing the credit card debt puzzle in the
context of monetary economics, and bringing to bear some of the ideas from modern theory.
However, to our knowledge — or maybe, in our opinion — there does not exist an appropriate
oﬀ-the-shelf model of money and credit that can be used to address the issue. So we build one.
While this is not meant to constitute the last word on rate of return dominance, because we do
need some strong assumptions, we think we have a logically consistent economic environment
that is useful for this purpose. While our framework builds on some recent results, we also
extend existing monetary theory along several dimensions. This is interesting in its own right,
since clearly getting coexistence of consumer credit and money in a logically consistent theory
is not easy. And from a substantive point of view, it allows us to interpret the coexistence of
credit card debt and money in the bank in a very diﬀerent light vis a vis the literature.3
2According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 77% of consumer transactions in 2001 used liquid assets (deﬁned
to include cash, bank deposits, and closely related instruments). According to the Consumer Expenditure Survey,
the median household described above (with $3,800 of credit card debt and $3,000 in the bank) spent $1,993 per
month on goods purchased with liquid assets (Telyukova 2005).
3This paper is about theory; whether the approach is able to account quantitatively for the salient aspects of
the data is the subject of ongoing research. See Telyukova (2005).
32T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We build on Lagos and Wright (2005), hereafter LW. That model gives agents periodic access
to centralized markets, in addition to the decentralized markets where due to frictions money
is essential for trade. Having some centralized markets is interesting for its own sake, and
also makes the analysis much more tractable than what one ﬁnds in much of the literature on
the microfoundations of money.4 However, existing versions of the model have nothing that
resembles consumer debt, and as we explain below, it is not easy to get consumer debt into
the framework without extending it in just the right way. Here we describe the basic physical
environment, for now focusing on a special case; later, we generalize.
A [0,1] continuum of agents live forever in discrete time. There is one nonstorable con-
sumption good at each date that agents may (stochastically) be able to produce using labor.
There is also money in this economy, a perfectly divisible and storable object that is intrinsically
worthless, but potentially could have use as a medium of exchange. The money supply is ﬁxed
for now at M, but later we allow it to vary over time. Although we use the word money, we
do not necessarily mean cash literally. It is not hard to recast the model with agents depositing
cash into bank accounts and paying for goods using checks or debit cards, as in He, Huang and
Wright (2005). We discuss this further below. It is relevant because what we have in mind is
not money per se, but relatively liquid assets more generally.
In LW, each period is divided into two subperiods. In one, there is a centralized Walrasian
market, and in the other, there is a decentralized market where agents meet according to a
random bilateral-matching process. With the additional assumption that agents are anonymous
in the decentralized market, a medium of exchange becomes essential.5 After each meeting of this
market agents go to the centralized market, where they engage in various activities that include
4See Molico (1997), Green and Zhou (1998), Camera and Corbae (1999), Zhou (1999) or Zhu (2003) for models
w h e r ea l lt r a d ei sd e c e n t r a l i z e d ,a n dt h ea n a l y s i si sm u c hm o r ed i ﬃcult. Earlier models, like Shi (1995) or Trejos
and Wright (1995), were also tractable, but only because money was assumed to be indivisible and agents were
allowed to hold at most 1 unit.
5See Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001) for formal discussions of what makes money essential.
4working and rebalancing their money holdings. If utility is linear in hours worked, all agents
take the same amount of money out of the centralized market, which is what keeps the analysis
relatively simple; without these assumptions, there is generally an endogenous distribution of
money across traders in the decentralized market that one has to track as a state variable.
As we said above, there is no role for credit in LW, and it is important to understand why it
is not easy to create such a role. Credit is not possible in the decentralized market because of the
assumption that agents are anonymous, which we cannot relax since this is what makes money
essential. And credit is not necessary in the centralized market because of the assumption
that all agents can work and have utility that is linear in hours, which we do not want to
relax since this is what keeps the analysis tractable. How to proceed? Our idea is to introduce
another subperiod (we generalize later to many subperiods) with a market where agents may
want to consume but cannot produce, which makes credit useful, and where we do not assume
anonymity, which makes credit feasible. We determine whether agents use cash or credit in this
market endogenously, while maintaining an essential role for money plus analytic tractability
due to the other two markets.6
All agents want to consume in subperiod (market) 1,a n du1(x1) is their common utility
function. A random subset want to consume in s =2 ,3, and conditional on this, us(xs) is
their utility function. Assume us(xs) is strictly increasing and concave. All agents are able to
produce in s =1 , and the disutility of working h1 hours is c1(h1)=h1. A random subset are
able to produce in s =2 ,3, and conditional on this, the disutility of working is an increasing and
convex function cs(hs). When they can produce, agents transform labor one-for-one into goods,
xs = hs.7 For simplicity, at any s =2 ,3 a random set of agents chosen in an i.i.d. manner want
to consume but cannot produce and vice-versa; no one can do both, but this would be easy to
6Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005a) also add a third subperiod to LW, but it is another round of decen-
tralized exchange and so there is no possibility of credit. Berentsen et al. (2005b) and Chiu and Meh (2006)
introduce a third subperiod with a centralized market in order to discuss banking, as in He et al. (2005); the
focus here is on an entirely diﬀerent set of issues, however.
7One can assume there is a real wage w that is constant and can be normalized to 1 because there are
competitive ﬁrms with linear technologies; it is easy to extend this and introduce ﬁrms with general technlologies
to determine w endogenously.
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s).L e tβs be the discount factor between s
and the next subperiod, with β1β2β3 < 1.
An individual’s state is (mst,b st), denoting money and debt in subperiod s of period t, but
we drop the t when there is no risk of confusion; e.g. we write mst = ms, ms,t+1 = ms,+1,
etc. Let Ws(ms,b s) be the value function. At s =1 ,2, the market value of money is φs,s o
ps =1 /φs is the nominal price level; there there is no φ3 since there is no centralized market
at s =3 , although prices will implicitly be deﬁned by trades. Similarly, the real interest rate
in the centralized markets at s =1 ,2 is rs, but there is no r3. Our convention for notation is
as follows: if you bring debt bs into subperiod s =1 ,2 you owe (1 + rs)bs. The plan now is to
consider each subperiod (market) in turn. After this, we put the pieces together and describe
equilibrium.
2.1 Market 1
At s =1 , there is a centralized market where agents solve8
W1(m1,b 1)= m a x
x1,h1,m2,b2
{u1(x1) − h1 + β1W2(m2,b 2)}
s.t. x1 = h1 + φ1(m1 − m2) − (1 + r1)b1 + b2.
Substituting h1 from the budget constraint into the objective function, we have
W1(m1,b 1)= m a x
x1,m2,b2
{u1(x1) − [x1 + φ1(m2 − m1)+( 1+r1)b1 − b2]+W2(m2,b 2)}. (1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
1=u0
1(x1) (2)
φ1 = β1W2m(m2,b 2) (3)
−1=β1W2b(m2,b 2). (4)
8To rule out Ponzi schemes, one normally imposes a credit limit bj ≤ ¯ B, either explicitly or implicitly. We do
not need this here because we can explicitly impose that agents pay oﬀ past debts at s =1each period without
loss in generality (due to quasi-linear utility). Also, we always assume an interior solution for h;s e eL Wf o r
conditions to guarantee this is valid in these types of models.
6Notice (2) implies x1 = x∗
1 for all agents, while (3)-(4) imply (m2,b 2) is independent of x1
and (m1,b 1) — a feature of quasi-linearity and a generalization of results in LW. As long as W2
is strictly concave, there is a unique solution for (m1,b 1). It is simple to check that the same
conditions that guarantee strict concavity in m used by LW also apply here, and so m2 = M
for all agents. However, we will see that W2 is actually linear in b2, which means we cannot
pin down b2 for any individual. This is no surprise with a competitive market and quasi-linear
utility: in equilibrium, agents are indiﬀerent between the allocation they have and an alternative
where they work a little more now, save the proceeds, and work a little less later.
Although this is true for any individual, it cannot be true in the aggregate, since the average
labor input ¯ h1 must equal total output x∗
1. Given this, one can resolve the indeterminacy for
individuals in two ways. First, one can focus on symmetric equilibria where all agents choose
the same solution when they have the same set of solutions to a maximization problem, which
is innocuous since other equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent and observationally equivalent at the
aggregate level; this pins down b2 = ¯ b2 for all agents. Alternatively, we could impose an ar-
bitrarily small but positive transaction cost on borrowing in subperiod 1, which would break
agents’ indiﬀerence and reﬁne away all but the symmetric equilibria. In what follows we take
the former route, and simply focus on symmetric equilibria.
Aggregating budget equations across agents, we have
¯ x1 = ¯ h1 + φ1(¯ m1 − ¯ m2) − (1 + r1)¯ b1 +¯ b2. (5)
In equilibrium, ¯ h1 =¯ x1 = x∗
1, ¯ m1 =¯ m2 = M,a n d¯ b1 =0(average debt must be 0). Hence
(5) implies b2 = ¯ b2 =0for all agents.9 We close the analysis of market 1 with the envelope
conditions
W1m(m1,b 1)=φ1 (6)
W1b(m1,b 1)=−(1 + r1), (7)
which imply that W1 is linear in (m1,b 1), another generalization of LW.
9This is the aforementioned condition that rules out Ponzi schemes.
72.2 Market 2
At s =2 ,am e a s u r eπ of agents want to consume but cannot produce, while a measure π can
produce but do not want to consume. In equilibrium, xC
2 = hP
2 ,w h e r exC
2 is the consumption
of consumers and hP




2 (m2,b 2)+( 1− 2π)WN




2 are the value functions for a consumer, a producer and a nontrader.
We study their problems one at a time, which is slightly tedious, but useful.
For a nontrader,
WN
2 (m2,b 2)=m a x
m3,b3
β2W3(m3,b 3)
s.t. 0=φ2(m2 − m3) − (1 + r2)b2 + b3.




















2 (m2,b 2)= m a x
x2,m3,b3
{u2(x2)+β2W3(m3,b 3)}
s.t. x2 = φ2(m2 − m3) − (1 + r2)b2 + b3.
10It might therefore appear that calling them nontraders is inaccurate, but we will see that in equilibrium they






























2 (m2,b 2)= m a x
h2,m3,b3
{−c2(h2)+β2W3(m3,b 3)}




























We cannot conclude that (m3,b 3) is independent of (m2,b 2), the way we could conclude that
(m2,b 2) is independent of (m1,b 1) in the previous subperiod. If xC
2 depends on (m2,b 2) then so
will (mC
3 ,b C
3 ), unless u2 is linear; and if hP
2 depends on (m2,b 2) then so will (mP
3 ,b P
3 ), unless c2





3 )+( 1− 2π)W3m(mN
3 ,b N
3 )] (20)








In market 3 trade occurs via anonymous bilateral meetings and bargaining.11 Because of
anonymity, you cannot use credit: I will not take your IOU because I understand you could
renege, without fear of punishment, given that I do not know who you are. However, one may
ask why some institution that is not anonymous cannot issue interest-bearing claims to goods
next period that might circulate in market 3. The simplest answer is to assume such claims
can be counterfeited. Thus, the government here has a monopoly on the production of non-
counterfeitable notes, and chooses to issue only non-interest-bearing money. These assumptions
are clearly strong. As suggested above, we do not presume to provide a deﬁnitive solution to
the rate of return dominance problem; we do think we have a logically consistent environment
in which there is a role for money plus credit.12
There is one more issue to address. As we said above, there is a version of the model where
agents deposit money in banks and pay with checks or debit cards in decentralized markets,
along the lines of He et al. (2005). Checks work even though consumers are anonymous,
because they are claims on the bank and not on the consumer personally (think of travellers’
checks as the purest example). In such a model, interest paid on checking accounts is determined
endogenously, but it will not equal the market interest rate on consumer credit, as it would in
a frictionless market, as long as we adopt one of several assumptions. We can simply assume
government prohibition of interest on checking, as was the case for much of U.S. history. Or
we can assume the bank has some operating costs. Or we can assume that banks need to hold
reserves, either to meet legal requirements or to facilitate settlement.
For example, suppose we have 100% reserve requirements (so-called narrow banking). Then
banks earn no revenue from and hence pay no interest on deposits. Indeed, if there are operating
costs, they pay negative interest — i.e. they charge a fee for checking privileges. In He et al.
11Bargaining is not a crucial part of the speciﬁcation — versions of related models exist with price taking and
price posting (as in Rocheteau and Wright 2005), and with auctions (once one allows some multilateral meetings,
as in Kircher and Galenianos 2006 or Julien, Kennes and King 2006).
12In Section 3 we discuss what happens when non-government securities can circulate as media of exchange.
10(2005), agents may be willing to deposit money in banks even at negative interest rates for safety
reasons (again think of travellers’ checks). As long as banks keep some reserves for whatever
reason and/or have some operating costs, the equilibrium interest rate on checking accounts is
below the market interest rate. The point is that liquidity comes at a cost. The pure monetary
model without banks captures this in an economical way, but it ought to be clear that the
underlying ideas apply more generally.
Consider a meeting where one agent wants to consume and the other can produce. Call the
former agent the buyer and the latter the seller. They bargain over the amount of consumption
for the buyer x3 and labor by the seller h3, and also a dollar payment d from to the former to
the latter. Since feasibility implies x3 = h3,w ed e n o t et h e i rc o m m o nv a l u eb yq.I f(m3,b 3) is
the state of a buyer and (˜ m3,˜ b3) the state of a seller, the outcome satisﬁes the generalized Nash
bargaining solution,
(q,d) ∈ argmax S(m3,b 3)θ ˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3)1−θ s.t. d ≤ m3, (22)
where θ is the bargaining power of the buyer, and the surpluses are given by
S(m3,b 3)=u3(q)+β3W1,+1(m3 − d,b3) − β3W1,+1(m3,b 3)
˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3)=−c3(q)+β3W1,+1(˜ m3 + d,˜ b3) − β3W1,+1(˜ m3,˜ b3).
Using (6) and (7), these simplify to
S(m3,b 3)=u3(q) − β3φ1,+1d
˜ S(˜ m3,˜ b3)=−c3(q)+β3φ1,+1d.
The constraint d ≤ m3 in (22) simply says a buyer cannot transfer more money than he has.
Given all this, we have the following generalization of LW (proof is in the Appendix).
Lemma 1. ∀(m3,b 3) and (˜ m3,˜ b3), the solution to the bargaining problem is
q =
½
g−1(β3m3φ1,+1) if m3 <m ∗
3




m3 if m3 <m ∗
3
m∗
3 if m3 ≥ m∗
3
(23)
11where q∗ solves u0
3(q∗)=c0











Clearly, the bargaining solution (q,d) depends on the buyer’s money holdings m3, but on no
other element of (m3,b 3) or (˜ m3,˜ b3); hence we write q = q(m3) and d = d(m3) from now on.
Of course, q and d at t also depend on φ1 at t +1 , but this is left implicit in the notation. We
show in the Appendix that, exactly as in LW, m3 <m ∗
3 in any equilibrium. Hence, from Lemma
1, buyers always spend all their money in market 3, and receive q = g−1(β3m3φ1,+1).N o t i c e






and to assume e0(q) < 0.S u ﬃcient conditions on preferences that guarantee e0(q) < 0 can be
found in LW; a simple condition that works for any preferences is θ ≈ 1,s i n c eθ =1implies
g(q)=c(q).
Let σ denote the probability of a meeting between a buyer and a seller in market 3. Then
W3(m3,b 3)=σ {u3[q(m3)]+β3W1[m3 − d(m3),b 3]}
+ σE{−c3[q(˜ m3)]+β3W1[m3 + d(˜ m3),b 3]} +( 1− 2σ)β3W1[m3,b 3], (26)
where E is the expectation of ˜ m3 (the money holdings of a random agent one meets, which we
will later show to be degenerate at ˜ m3 = M). Diﬀerentiating (26) and using (6) and (7),
W3m(m3,b 3)=β3φ1,+1 {σe[q(m3)] + 1 − σ} (27)
W3b(m3,b 3)=−β3(1 + r1,+1). (28)
As described by (27), the marginal value of money in market 3 is a weighted average of the
values of spending it and of carrying it forward to next period, while (28) gives the marginal
value of debt as the value of simply rolling it over.
122.4 Equilibrium
Our deﬁnition of equilibrium is relatively standard, except that there is no market-clearing
condition for market 3: since trade is bilateral in this market, it clears automatically. To reduce
notation, we describe every agent’s problem at s =1 ,2 in terms of choosing (xs,h s,m s+1,b s+1),
which are implicitly functions of the state, where it is understood that for producers xP
2 =0 ,
for consumers hC
2 =0 , and for nontraders xN
2 = hN
2 =0 .13
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium is a set of (possibly time-dependent) value functions {Ws},
s =1 ,2,3, decision rules {xs,h s,m s+1,b s+1}, s =1 ,2, bargaining outcomes {q,d}, and prices
{rs,φ s}, s =1 ,2, such that:
1. Optimization: In every period, for every agent, {Ws}, s =1 ,2,3, solve the Bellman equa-
tions (1), (8) and (26); {xs,h s,m s+1,b s+1}, s =1 ,2, solve the relevant maximization
problems; and {q,d} solve the bargaining problem.
2. Market clearing: In every period,
¯ xs = ¯ hs, ¯ ms+1 = M, ¯ bs+1 =0 , s =1 ,2
where for any variable y, ¯ y =
R
yidi denotes the aggregate.
Deﬁnition 2. A steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium where the endogenous variables are
constant across time periods (although not generally across subperiods within a period).
We are mainly interested in equilibria where money is valued, which means that it is valued
in all subperiods in every period.
Deﬁnition 3. A monetary equilibrium is an equilibrium where, in every period, φs > 0, s =1 ,2,
and q>0.
13We do not include the distribution of the state variable in the deﬁnition of equilibrium, but it is implicit:
given an initial distribution F1(m,b) at the start of subperiod 1, the decision rules generate F2(m,b);t h e nt h e
decision rules at s =2generate F3(m,b); and the bargaining outcome at s =3generates F1,+1(m,b).A l s o ,a sw e
said above, we only consider equilibria where we have an interior solution for h.
13We now characterize steady-state equilibria (the steady state requirement is relaxed below).
First, recall that in equilibrium we impose that in market 1, if two agents have multiple solutions
for b2 they choose the same one. As we discussed above, due to quasi-linear utility, any other
equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent for individuals, and observationally equivalent at the aggregate
level. Further, in any of the other equilibria, prices and consumption are exactly the same as
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In any steady state monetary equilibrium:
1. At s =1 , all agents choose x1 = x∗
1, m2 = M, b2 =0 ,a n d
h1 = h1(m1,b 1)=x∗
1 − φ1(m1 − M)+( 1+r1)b1,
which implies ¯ h1 = x∗
1.
2. At s =2 ,
consumers choose x2 = x∗
2, m3 = M and b3 = x∗
2;
producers choose h2 = x∗
2, m3 = M and b3 = −x∗
2;
nontraders choose m3 = M and b3 =0 .


























Proof: To begin, insert the envelope condition for W3b from (28) into (13) and (17) to get
u0
2(xC
2 )=β2β3(1 + r1,+1) (30)
c0
2(hP





2 ), and hence xC
2 = hP
2 = x∗
2. Similarly, insert the envelope condition

























Given e0(q) < 0 and q0(m) > 0 for all m<m ∗
3,p l u sxC
2 = hP
2 = x∗
2, we conclude mC
3 = mP
3 .










= φ2(1 + r1,+1) (34)
Exactly the same condition results from combining (30) and (32) for a consumer, or (31) and
(33) for a producer. Hence, we conclude mN
3 = mC
3 = mP
3 = M. From the budget equations,








3 =( 1 + r2)b2.
This completes the description of market 2. Moving back to market 1, clearly (2) implies
x1 = x∗
1. Inserting the envelope conditions for W2 and W3 into (3) and (4), we have
φ1 = β1β2β3φ1,+1{σe[q(M)] + 1 − σ} (35)
1=β1β2β3(1 + r2)(1 + r1,+1), (36)
w h e r ew eu s ei nt h eﬁr s tc a s et h er e s u l tt h a tW3m depends on m3 but not b3,a n dm3 = M.N o t i c e
(36) is an arbitrage condition between r2 and r1,+1: if it does not hold there is no solution to the
agents’ problem at s =1 ; and if it does hold then any choice of b2 is consistent with optimization.




= σe[q(M)] + 1 − σ. (37)
15In steady state this implies (29).
The only things left to determine are the prices. We get r1 from (30) with x2 = x∗
2,a n d
then set r2 in terms of r1 to satisfy the arbitrage condition (36). Given q,L e m m a1t e l l su s





This completes the proof. ¥
The central result of Theorem 1 is that at s =2 , consumers buy on credit (b3 = x∗
2)e v e n
though they are holding m3 = M a n de v e nt h o u g hb u y i n go nc r e d i te n t a i l sac o s ti nt e r m so f
interest. The reason, of course, is that they know they may need the money at s =3 .
We now discuss rates of return. Condition (34) equates the value of a dollar’s worth of cash
and a dollar’s worth of credit coming out of market 2. The left side is a weighted average of the
marginal gain if the dollar is spent in market 3, u0(q)q0(m3)=β3φ1,+1e(q), and the return if it
is not spent but carried forward to the next period, β3φ1,+1. The right side of (34) is the real
return (the interest saving) from using the same dollar to pay down debt, β3φ2(1+r1,+1).N o t i c e
the return to money includes a liquidity premium:w es h o wb e l o wt h a te(q) > 1 in equilibrium,
and hence the value to spending a dollar is higher than the value to carrying it to the next
period. If one ignores the liquidity premium, and simply considers the return on carrying money
across periods, then it looks like — indeed, it is — rate of return dominance.









1 − σ + σe(q)
.
T h er e s u l tf o l l o w si f1 − σ + σe(q) > 1,o re(q) > 1. However, by (29), in steady state e(q)=
1+ρ/σ. ¥
16Two brief comments are in order. First, we can price nominal bonds via the Fisher equation,
which is simply a no-arbitrage condition, to get the nominal rate 1+i1,+1 =( 1+r1,+1)φ2/φ1,+1.
Then Theorem 2 can be equivalently stated as i1,+1 > 0. Second, the above results are framed
in terms of rates of return between s =2at t and s =1at t+1, because this seems most natural
given it is at s =2that the key decision is made (whether to pay with cash or credit). But we
could use returns over the entire period. From s =1at t to s =1at t +1 , the gross return on
money in steady state is 1, while the return on credit (paying down debt) is (1+r2)(1 +r1,+1).
We readily get (1 + r2)(1 + r1,+1) > 1 from (36), given β1β2β3 < 1, so obviously rate of return
dominance holds across the entire period.
3 Additional Discussion
As we discuss here, the analysis is ea s i l ye x t e n d e di ns e v e r a lw a y s . 14 First, in any equilibrium,
and not just in steady state, essentially everything in Theorems 1 and 2 holds, except that (37)




= σe(q+1)+1− σ. (38)
A monetary equilibrium is a bounded, positive, solution {qt} to (38), along with values for the
other objects satisfying the same conditions as above. There exist many equilibrium paths for
{qt} (see Lagos and Wright 2003 for details), but in all equilibria, xs, bs,a n drs are exactly
as given in Theorem 1. And although φ1 and φ2 vary over time with q, Theorem 2 still holds
exactly as stated.
Second, suppose the money supply changes at constant rate γ: M+1 =( 1+γ)M.T h e ni ti s
natural to look for equilibria where all real variables, including q and φM, are constant. Hence,
φ1/φ1,+1 =1+γ, and (37) becomes
(1 + ρ)(1 + γ)=σe[q(M)] + 1 − σ.
14We already mentioned that bargaining can be replaced with price taking, posting, or auctions, and the main
results go through.





Thus, q is decreasing in i, but this does not aﬀect the real allocation in markets 1 and 2. As is
standard, the Friedman rule i =0is the lower bound on inﬂation, and also the optimal policy.
At i =0 , the returns on money and credit are the same, and we lose rate of return dominance,
but for any i>0 everything is qualitatively the same.
The next point concerns our restriction that claims traded in the centralized market cannot
circulate in the decentralized market, other than money, due to the assumption that individuals
are anonymous and there is no institution can issue non-counterfeitable securities, other than the
monetary authority. This is obviously an extreme assumption, meant to capture in a logically
consistent way the idea that money is a relatively liquid asset. Consider the other extreme, where
there is some perfectly safe, non-counterfeitable, security other than cash that can be used as
a medium of exchange. To be concrete, consider a standard one-period, pure-discount security
that sells for price ψ in the centralized market today and pays 1 unit of the consumption good
in the next centralized market. Assume for now that there is no money and no other consumer
credit, only this security, and let a be the amount of it brought into a period.15
To illustrate the idea, it suﬃces to consider a model with two rather than three subperiods
— i.e. the basic LW set up — and it is convenient to add a little heterogeneity. Thus, there
are now two types: type 1 are the agents in the benchmark LW model, while type 0 never
go to the decentralized market (say, they do not consume or produce that good). Given this,
it is convenient to change notation slightly. Let U(x) − h be the common preferences in the
centralized market, and let u(q)−c(q) be type 1 preferences in the decentralized market. Let W
and V be the value functions for type 1 in the centralized and decentralized markets, and J the
15This security cannot be indexed by events that happen to you in the decentralized market, since they are not
observable to others, and for simplcity there is no uncertainty in the centralized market, so it is not contingent
on anything. We will show there is no role for any other securities. In particular, a takes the place of consumer
debt b in the benchmark model, with a = −b,t h ed i ﬀerence being that now a c a nb et r a d e di nt h ed e c e n t r a l i z e d
market. As always, we need to rule out Ponzi schemes.
18value function for type 0. Also, to reduce notation, assume agents discount across centralized
markets at t and t +1 , but not between centralized and decentralized markets.
For type 0,
J(a)= m a x
x,h,a+1
{U(x) − h + βJ+1(a+1)}
s.t. x = h + a − ψa+1,
since they do not participate in the decentralized market. For type 1,
W(a)= m a x
x,h,a+1
{U(x) − h + V (a+1)}
s.t. x = h + a − ψa+1,
where
V (a)=σ {u[q(a)]+βW[a − d(a)]} + σE{−c[q(˜ a)]+βW[a + d(˜ a)]} +( 1− 2σ)βW (a).
For type 0, the ﬁrst order conditions are U0(x)=1 ,w h i c hi m p l i e sx = x∗,a n dψ = βW0
+1(a+1),
which combined with the envelope condition implies the no-arbitrage condition ψ = β.F o rt y p e
1, the ﬁrst order conditions are U0(x)=1and ψ = V 0(a+1). Using the envelope condition, plus
V 0(a)=σu0(q)q0(a)+(1−σ)β and the bargaining solution βa = g(q),w eh a v e
ψ = β [σe(q)+1−σ].
Since we already established ψ = β,w ec o n c l u d et h a te(q)=1 , and denote the solution by
q1. As is standard, if θ =1then q1 = q∗ and we get the ﬁrst best, while if θ<1 then q1 <q ∗ and
we do not, but we can do no better by introducing money. Indeed, no one would hold money,
since it has a lower return than a, unless we run the Friedman rule, and does no better in terms
of liquidity. It is clear that we need to make some assumption to give money an advantage in
terms of liquidity if we are to get rate of return dominance.16
16See Lagos and Rocheteau (2004), Lagos (2006), and Geromichalos, Licari and Suárez-Lledó (2006) for an
extended analysis of related models, with multiple assets, all of which can be used as media of exchange.
19It remains to discuss market clearing. Assume there is a measure 1 of type 0 agents and
N1 of type 1 agents, and that we start at the initial date where everyone has a =0 .F r o m
βa = g(q1), the demand for a by each type 1 agent in the ﬁrst period is g(q1)/β; hence the total
demand by type 0 must be −N1g(q1)/β, which is consistent with maximization, given ψ = β.
From the budget constraint, in the ﬁrst period a type 0 agent sets
h = x + ψa1 = x∗ − N1g(q1).
At every future t, he must make good on his negative at position, but again sets at+1 =
−N1g(q1)/β, and ends up working h = x∗. He therefore has a one-time “seigniorage” gain
(in terms of h) from selling short the asset that others use as a medium of exchange. In any
case, it is clear that there is no role for money in this model as speciﬁed; and it should also be
clear that government has an incentive to rule out the use of a as a medium of exchange so they
can get the “seigniorage” for themselves.
Finally, to close this discussion section, we note the following. Although the baseline three-
subperiod model clearly delivers on the main goal — agents carrying debt and money simulta-
neously — as long as we make some assumptions that give money a liquidity advantage, it does
not have another feature that one might ﬁnd desirable. Namely, our agents do not roll over debt
for more than one period; they pay it oﬀ each period in market 1. Of course, they have to pay
it oﬀ sometime (assuming no Ponzi schemes), and given utility is linear in h at s =1 ,t h i si sa
good time to do so. But we show in the next section that in a generalized version of the model
agents do generally roll over debt.
4G e n e r a l M o d e l
We pursue two generalizations. First, we allow any number n of subperiods per period (n could
even change over time). Second, there are now centralized and decentralized markets open si-
multaneously in every subperiod. Agents visit one market or the other each subperiod according
to the following process: an agent in the centralized market at s moves to the decentralized mar-
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Figure 1: Market Structure
ket at s +1with probability δs; and an agent in the decentralized market at s moves to the
centralized market at s+1with probability 1.17 Now agents may want to hold money for every
s, even if this is costly, since they might ﬁnd themselves in need of it at s +1 .
For convenience, we set δn =0 , so that everyone is in the centralized market at s =1 ,
and assume all agents can produce with utility linear in hours, as in the benchmark model.
For each s ∈ {2,...,n}, the centralized markets are in the spirit of market 2 in the benchmark
model, in the sense that credit is available, although we generalize the assumption that some
agents cannot produce by now saying that productivity ωs diﬀe r sr a n d o m l yi na ni . i . d .m a n n e r
across agents and s (for convenience, ω1 is known and constant across agents). Agents in the
centralized markets at s>1 have general utility functions Us(xs,h s). The decentralized markets
are in the spirit of market 3 in the benchmark, in the sense that some agents are buyers, some
are sellers, and they meet and bargain bilaterally. Sellers can produce output one-for-one with
labor in this market, that is, productivity is not random. Let Ws(ωs,m s,b s) be the centralized
and Vs(ms,b s) the decentralized market value function at s. See Figure 1.
At s =1 , everyone is in the centralized market, and solves a problem that is very similar to
the centralized market problem in various related models:
W1(ω1,m 1,b 1)= m a x
x1,h1,m2,b2
{U1(x1) − h1 + β1(1 − δ1)EW2(ω2,m 2,b 2)+β1δ1V2(m2,b 2)}
s.t. x1 = ω1h1 + φ1(m1 − m2)+b2 − (1 + r1)b1
17Thus, agents are never in the decentralized market for two or more periods in a row, which is convenient
because it guarantees they are always willing to spend all their money when they get there. This trick is borrowed
from Williamson (2005). By the way, the baseline LW model is the special case where n =2and δ1 =1 .
21The ﬁrst-order conditions are
1/ω1 = U1x(x1) (40)
φ1/ω1 = β1(1 − δ1)EW2m(ω2,m 2,b 2)+β1δ1V2m(m2,b 2) (41)
−1/ω1 = β1(1 − δ1)EW2b(ω2,m 2,b 2)+β1δ1V2b(m2,b 2). (42)
The envelope conditions are
W1m(ω1,m 1,b 1)=φ1/ω1 (43)
W1b(ω1,m 1,b 1)=−(1 + r1) (44)
Again, as in the benchmark model, W1 is linear, everyone chooses the same x1,a n d(m2,b 2) is
independent of (m1,b 1).
At s>1, agents in the centralized market solve:18
Ws(ωs,m s,b s)= m a x
xs,hs,ms+1,bs+1
{Us(xs,h s)+βs(1 − δs)EWs+1(ωs+1,m s+1,b s+1)
+ βsδsVs+1(ms+1,b s+1)}
s.t. xs = ωshs + φs(ms − ms+1)+bs+1 − (1 + rs)bs
First-order conditions are
0=ωsUsx(xs,h s)+Ush(xs,h s) (45)
φsUsx(xs,h s)=βs(1 − δs)EWs+1,m(ωs+1,m s+1,b s+1)+βsδsVs+1,m(ms+1,b s+1) (46)
−Usx(xs,h s)=βs(1 − δs)EWs+1,b(ωs+1,m s+1,b s+1)+βsδsVs+1,b(ms+1,b s+1) (47)
Note (40) is a special case of (45) where U1h(x1,h 1)=−1, and (41)-(42) are special cases of
(46)-(47) where U1x(x1,h 1)=1 /ω1. The envelope conditions are
Wsm(ωs,m s,b s)=φsUsx(xs,h s) (48)
Wsb(ωs,m s,b s)=−(1 + rs)Usx(xs,h s). (49)
18We adopt the obvious notational convention of identifying subperiod n +1at t with subperiod 1 at t +1 .
22In the decentralized market bargaining problem, for simplicity, we set θ =1in this section.
Hence, in equilibrium, ds = ms and qs solves
c(qs)=βsEWs+1[ωs+1, ˜ ms + ms,(1 + rs)bs] − βsEWs+1[ωs+1, ˜ ms,(1 + rs)bs], (50)
which can be used to compute q0(ms).19 Also,
Vs(ms,b s)=σE{u(qs)+βsWs+1 [ωs+1,0,(1 + rs)bs]} +( 1− σ)βsEWs+1 [ωs+1,m s,(1 + rs)bs]
and, hence,
Vsm(ms,b s)=σu0(qs)q0(ms)+( 1− σ)βsEWs+1,m [ωs+1,m s,b s(1 + rs)] (51)
Vsb(ms,b s)=βs(1 + rs)EWs+1,b [ωs+1,m s,b s(1 + rs)]. (52)
By repeated substitution, the ﬁrst-order conditions in the centralized market at s for ms+1
and bs+1 can be written
φsUsx(xs,hs)=βsβs+1 ···βnφ1,+1{δs[σe(qs+1)+1− σ]+( 1− δs)δs+1[σe(qs+2)+1− σ]
+... +( 1− δs)(1 − δs+1) ···(1 − δn−1)} (53)
Usx(xs,hs)=βsβs+1 ···βn(1 + rs+1)(1 + rs+2) ···(1 + r1,+1), (54)
where e(qs) is deﬁned in (25). By (54) Usx(xs,hs) is constant across agents — i.e. independent of
their (ωs,m s,b s) — and hence by (48)-(49) Wsm and Wsb a r et o o .T h a ti s ,Ws is linear (ms,b s),
for all s. Moreover, (50) now implies
q0
s(ms)=
βsβs+1 ···βnφs+1(1 + rs+2) ···(1 + r1,+1)
c0(qs)
. (55)
Also, (46) now has the following property: the left side is constant and the right side depends
on ms+1, since this is the only thing that inﬂuences qs+1 which is the only thing that inﬂuences
Vs+1,m. In other words, (46) pins down ms+1, independent of (ωs,m s,b s). All agents carry the
same amount of money, as in the benchmark model.
19The expectation in this expression is with respect to both ωs+1 and ˜ ms, the money of the seller one meets.
We show below, however, that ˜ ms = M, exactly as in the benchmark model, and Ws is linear in ms,s ot h e
bargaining solution q does not actually depend on ˜ ms.
23We can summarize what we now know about equilibrium as follows.20 F i r s td e n o t et h er i g h t
side of (54) by ks.T h e n g i v e n ks, (54) for s =1 ,...n, (45) for s =2 ,...n, and (40) constitute
2n−1 equations in 2n−1 unknowns, pinning down (¯ x1,...¯ xn,¯ h2,...¯ hn) (as functions of interest
rates). Notice h1 does not appear in these conditions. We also established that ms+1 = M for
all agents for all s. The centralized market budget equation therefore tells us
bs+1 =( 1+rs)bs +¯ xs − ωs¯ hs − φsms + φsM.
This says that agents’ debt at s +1will be equal to their debt at s, all of which is rolled over
(principle plus interest), plus consumption expenditure minus labor income, with an adjustment
to maintain cash balances at the desired level.21
The key point is that some agents will quite generally carry debt, which is costly in terms
of interest, while maintaining a stock of money. When they get to the start of the next period,
they pay oﬀ their debts by adjusting h1,+1. In particular, an agent that draws a low ωs will not








by virtue of (45). His consumption may be higher or lower, depending on the cross-derivative








For example, if U is separable in xs and hs,h ew i l ln o tl o w e rxs.H ew i l lo f t e np u r c h a s ep a r t
of xs on credit while maintaining ms+1 = M.W h e nωs is small and ms = M, he will purchase
most of xs on credit while not adjusting his money holdings. In the worst-case scenario, when
ωs is small and ms =0 , he purchases current goods on credit and also takes out a cash advance.
We collect some key results from this analysis as follows.
20We do not provide a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium here since it is an obvious generalization of the deﬁnitions
in the benchmark model.
21An individual’s ms may be above (below) his desired level for s+1if he just returned from the decentralized
market where he acted as a seller (buyer). In general, if δs varies with s then desired real balances will, too; since
we must have ms = M in equilibrium, this show up in the price φs.
24Theorem 3. In the model with n subperiods, in any monetary equilibrium,
1. For all s, every agent leaves the centralized market with the same ms+1.
2. For all s, Usx(xs,h s)=ks and Ush(xs,h s)=−ksωs where ks is constant across agents in
the centralized market.
3. If two agents have diﬀerent (ms,b s) and the same ωs,t h e i rhs, xs and ms+1 are the same,
so they have diﬀerent bs+1; if two agents have the same (ms,b s) and diﬀerent ωs,t h e i rhs
will diﬀer and they typically have diﬀerent bs+1.
4. Agents may roll over or run up debts between s =2and s = n while maintaining, and
sometimes even increasing, their holdings of ms.
Theorem 4. (Rate of Return Dominance) In any monetary equilibrium, for all s 6= n,
φ1,+1
φs
< (1 + rs+1)(1 + rs+2)...(1 + rn)(1 + r1,+1) (56)
To say a little more about Theorem 4, a dollar held at s may be spent in the decentralized
market in any of the subperiods that follow; or it may not, in which case it is brought into
t +1where it yields ex post return φ1,+1/φs. Alternatively, a dollar at s of consumer credit
yields compound interest between then and t+1given by the right side of (56). The inequality
indicates, as always, that the true value of money is greater than the return from simply carrying
it into t +1with probability 1, since it has liquidity value. In particular, from the ﬁrst-order
conditions for ms+1 and bs+1 we get
φ1,+1
φs
{δs[σe(qs+1)+1− σ]+( 1− δs)δs+1[σe(qs+2)+1− σ]
+... +( 1− δs)(1 − δs+1)...(1 − δn−1)}
=( 1+rs+1)(1 + rs+2)...(1 + rn)(1 + r1,+1) (57)
Theorem 4 then follows from the result that e(qs) > 1 for all s.
255C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have tried to re-visit a classic issue: the coexistence of assets with diﬀerent
returns. An example of this issue is the so-called credit card debt puzzle, but more generally,
it is known as rate of return dominance. We build on the recent monetary theory literature by
allowing the option to sometimes trade using credit. Our model is tractable. It yields strong
and interesting outcomes, including the prediction that agents may purchase on credit, even
when this has a cost in terms of interest and they have liquid assets at hand. While we think
that there is more theoretical work to be done on rate of return dominance, and certainly more
quantitative work to be done, we hope this constitutes progress.
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29Appendix
In this Appendix we do several things. First we derive the bargaining solution given in Lemma
1. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for (22) are
θ
£
β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)
¤
u0
3 (q)=( 1 − θ)
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β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)
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β3φ1,+1 =( 1 − θ)
£





u3 (q) − β3φ1,+1d
¤1−θ £
β3φ1,+1d − c3 (q)
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on d ≤ m3. There are two possible cases: If the constraint
does not bind, then λ =0 , q = q∗ and d = m∗. If the constraint binds then q is given by (58)
with d = m3,a sc l a i m e d .
We now argue that m3 <m ∗
3. First, as is standard, in any equilibrium φ1,+1 ≤ (1 + ρ)φ1;
this just says the nominal interest rate i is nonnegative. In fact, again as is standard, although
we allow i → 0, we only consider equilibria where i>0,s ot h a tφ1,+1 < (1+ρ)φ1. Now suppose
m3 >m ∗
3 at some date for some agent. Since the bargaining solution tells us he never spends
more than m∗
3, he could reduce m3 by reducing h1 at t, then increase h1 at t +1so that he
need not change anything else. It is easy to check that this increases utility, so m3 >m ∗
3 cannot
occur in any equilibrium.
Hence m3 ≤ m∗
3. To show the strict inequality, suppose m3 = m∗
3 for same agent. Again he
can reduce h1 at t and carry less money. If he is a buyer in subperiod 3, he gets a smaller q, but
the continuation value is the same since by the bargaining solution he still spends all his money.
If he does not buy then he can increase h1 at t+1so that he need not change anything else. It
is easy to check that the net gain from carrying less money is positive, exactly as in LW.
30